MNEK: The Indonesian Navy's Second Track Diplomacy in The South China Sea Conflict Settlement

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Abstract
In the past several decade's demands for maritime security has increased in significant numbers as indicated by the growing challenge in the seas, promoting various strategic ways to identify problems and to seek the best solutions to the problems. Negotiating a South China Sea conflict settlement and a political solution, at the top political and military level, was an obvious priority for peace-brokers in the conflict area. A quandary of the first track and official diplomatic efforts have pursued the confidence of the government, claimant states, and regional states to negotiate and implement a conflict-settlement agreement. The limitations of the first-track approach have associated with the hard way and a deadlock in making peace and settling the conflict. On the other side, track two or second-track diplomacy (STRAD) played a minimal role in facilitating the signing of a settlement. It, though, served as a reconciliatory effort at the unofficial level. STRAD made a critical contribution to the formal peace process by providing the unarmed actors with an unofficial opportunity to voice their interests in the conflict. Unofficial STRAD efforts conducted outside the officials served to provide an alternative solution with a platform of interaction and engagement.

Keywords: second-track diplomacy (STRAD), maritime security, South China Sea, conflict area.

Introduction.
Second-Track Diplomacy (STRAD) Concept
In 1981, Joseph Montville was the first introduced the term "second-track" or "track two" diplomacy. The term was stated in the process when he tried to define the informal and non-government activities, which brought about a diplomatic resolution of conflicts (Lee 1997). Montville needs to label the differences between efforts, which was people to people and that government to government. In its original conception, "track two" or "citizen" diplomacy refers to private citizens discussing issues that usually reserved for official negotiations (Peter Jones, 2015).

STRAD rises above the narrow power-based approaches of traditional diplomacy by substituting the nation-state as the primary settlement of a conflict. In other words, rather than only pursuing strategic interests by conducting favorable discussions with just governments, a fundamental characteristic of track one missions, STRAD seeks to include all parties to the conflict. STRAD recognizes its part of a practice of mounting shared thoughtful between larger groups of the citizen, while track one diplomacy tends to limit its focus to the narrower world of the politician or military leaders. STRAD tries to make its...
impact felt on the entirety of what it describes as identity groups: namely, communities that share a specific ethnic, regional, national, socio-economic, or other identities. Rather than just trying to inspire military leaders or politicians to make decisions based on a standard calculation of interests and options, STRAD seeks to help all the people involved to change their way of thinking.

The concept of STRAD stems from the belief that conflict can be avoided by building linkages of friendship and shared understanding between people. Changes in the way they are thinking, settlement of the conflict, and finding the possible solutions are the objectives to bring people together. In this way, STRAD can transform conflict to be a constructive dialogue between those involved in disputes. The engagements between citizens of different political positions adapted the requirements of techniques of bargaining and negotiation. STRAD, therefore, entails processes such as problem-solving workshops, dialogues, cultural exchanges, and between people that are engaged in a dispute. These methods are a must for STRAD practitioners who have neither acquired such skills nor developed them appropriately.

Although STRAD happened between two or more groups in a conflict, it also designed at working with only one party to gain a proper understanding of other people’s positions. Working with a single-agent can be useful in facilitating group cohesiveness where individuals become marginalized by their group.

"Power-based, official and frequently inflexible method of formal interface amongst briefed governments of free states" recognizes as first track diplomacy (McDonald 1991:201-202). Additionally, track one practices can easily construe as interfering in the internal affairs of a free nation. Under such situations where first track communications can easily break down, STRAD channels can be a working method to resume dialogue and interaction needed for a settlement to the conflict.

STRAD is a non-governmental, unofficial, and informal form of conflict settlement that has potentially reduced the tendency for prolonged conflict by improving dialogues and encouraging shared interests amongst the warring groups. The importance of chasing informal communication among groups on conflicting edges is that they have the ability of scaling-down a conflict before any formal talks can effort to establish. Unofficial interventions are more ready for handling Intra-state conflicts.

Indeed, STRAD should not substitute the first track diplomacy but rather as an additional channel that offers a preliminary segment for productive dialogues. As a pre-dialogues tool, STRAD efforts could provide crucial information to pave the way for a peaceful settlement. In general, track two
diplomacies can be most effective when linked to the formal peace process at the government level.

Despite STRAD being a relatively recent practice, it has been able to record some successes. A classic example is a contribution made by Former Vice of President Yusuf Kalla, who became the negotiator between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (FAM). Furthermore, the 2009 Aceh Tsunami was eventually becoming a turning point for FAM, the people of Aceh, and the Government of Indonesia (Kompas, December 26, 2019). Central government assistance knocked the hearts of FAM leaders to open dialogue space. The Acehnese, who were full of terror during the establishment of the status of the Military Operations Area in the Veranda of Mecca, could breathe with relief from a ceasefire. Kalla played a central role in negotiations between the central government and FAM.

The South China Sea Conflict

The case of disputes that occurred in the South China Sea region is one of the most complicated regional dispute cases that ever occurred in Southeast Asia. This dispute does involve not only several parties at once, namely Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Malaysia, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but also includes several issues related to overlapping territorial claims and withdrawal of sea boundaries in the region. Although the current dispute in the South China Sea is relatively peaceful, the fact that the dispute has not unresolved entirely allows friction or even military confrontation in the future. In the last five years at the trends, tensions that have arisen between disputing parties show a higher level than in the previous decade. For this reason, a clear peace settlement framework is compulsory to avoid a worsening situation in the future.

Nevertheless, the peaceful settlement approach that has endeavored so far has not been able to resolve the dispute that has existed since four decades ago. In the first-track diplomacy, a regional approach by Indonesia has already implemented. The approval of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, which was quite successful

Right on August 15, 2005, the signed of the Helsinki agreement by FAM and the Indonesian government, evidenced a sign of peace had established in the Veranda of Mecca. This peace process is an example of the success of STRAD. "It was a long-term process with adequate time spent on building trust between all the parties involved in negotiations. It was not public and maintained a high level of confidentiality" (Mitchell, 1993:8).
in managing disputes, but this approach has not been able to support dispute resolution sustainably. In addition to difficulties in mediating the conflict given that several Southeast Asian countries are also parties to the dispute, several other factors have hampered the regional approach, such as the ASEAN member states that want the role in resolving the conflict and countries that want a bilateral settlement such as the one conceived by China. At the other extreme at the first track diplomacy level, the bilateralism approach initiated by China also has limitations. First and foremost, a strategy that tends to lead to "devide et impera" towards countries in the region will not be in China's interests in the long run. Second, the increasingly assertive policies of China in this dispute will be counterproductive to its bilateral approach.

Reflecting on the limitations of the first track diplomacy carried out by ASEAN, Indonesia, and China, a sustainable peace settlement approach, if it refers to the multi-track diplomacy theory, will be more likely to be achieved if it involves and empowers other potentials at all levels of existing diplomacy. In this case, the exploration of second-track diplomacy is one of the potentials to support and cover the limitations that exist in the first-track diplomacy.

**MNEK: The Indonesian Navy's STRAD**

The Komodo Exercises hosted by the Indonesian Navy is an example of the implementation of the Strad. The exercise with the theme "Cooperation to Strengthen International Maritime Security," focuses on Non-Warfighting exercises and with the theme raised and is believed to be able to articulate a common interest in increasing interoperability among the Navy, in order to maintain the stability of regional maritime security. These exercises allowed the unarmed military to achieve greater coordination of their programs and an opportunity to organize themselves into a settlement for the South China Sea conflict.

In this exercise, the Navy of various countries worked together to carry out humanitarian aid mission scenario activities, such as the Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP), the Engineering Civic Action Project (ENCAP), and the Maritime Peace Keeping Operation (MPKO) exercise. Komodo Exercise aims to the readiness to support peace and maintain stability in the regional and global.

One of the implementations of the STRAD by the Indonesian Navy is the symposium. In the second MNEK in 2016, the Indonesian Navy was also the host for the 15th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) with the theme of "Maritime Partnership for Stability in the Western Pacific Region." Experts and practitioners have made share knowledge and insights about maritime security and stability in the region. In a bid to support maritime security, regional countries generally seek cooperation and partnerships.
in dealing with any threat. All countries are aware that they could not alone face challenges. WPNS is a vital forum to implement regional maritime partnerships that would need a strong foundation and mutual trust between countries or navies. WPNS is also proof of the effectiveness of second-track diplomacy conducted by the Navy. The key to successful diplomacy in developing mutual trust lies in the men and actors to developing collective confidence and cooperation peacefully for mutual interest and benefit.

The symposium is one example of second-track diplomacy that has been carried out so far and has the potential to support sustainable dispute resolution conducted in first-track diplomacy. There are at least two critical things that are the reasons for the second-track diplomacy in resolving this conflict.

First, emphasizing diplomacy in this symposium that informal second track diplomacy provides an opportunity for the parties to the dispute to be able to attend in a personal capacity and express their opinions more openly without the pressure that occurs in the first track diplomacy. The second reason for the importance of this symposium as a potential supporter of the settlement of a sustainable peace dispute is related to Indonesia itself as the host country. In addition to the fact that Indonesia is not a claimant nation, which makes its position as a mediator more acceptable to all parties, Indonesia act as a normative leader in a region that is often trusted to mediate disputes.

Conclusion
There are some Indonesia Navy's efforts to perform the mechanism of management and settlement of the South China Sea dispute that Indonesia has carried out on second-track diplomacy. As part of second track diplomacy, MNEK has been evolving, blended of both navy network and people-to-people linkages. Not merely the network of sailors but goes beyond that, and it has become more sound. Indonesia has contributed to the advancement of STRAD. First, Indonesia as representative of ASEAN member countries that played a significant role as a driving seat. It has made "competing for regional power" feel comfortable. Second, the relative success of the second track has complemented and increased the leverage of Indonesian diplomacy, particularly in the Asian region.

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